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ABSTRACT: Social movement spillover is an internal social movement sector outcome in which 
movements influence one another. Although research on social movement outcomes has advanced 
significantly in recent years, there has been less work on consequences that movements have on one 
another. One reason for this is that research on social movement spillover has been limited by its reliance 
on a small number of research methods, nearly all of which involve pre-selecting movements that are 
expected to be at risk of spillover. In this article, we contribute important new findings to the study of 
spillover in two ways. First, we examine a novel form of spillover: agenda spillover, which occurs when 
the goals of one movement come to be taken up by another movement in a serious or enduring manner 
(e.g., when racial justice goals become embedded in environmental goals). Second, using social network 
and computational methods, validated by significant pre-study testing, and event history analysis, we 
examine what factors seem to explain agenda spillover. We find that the social movement sector, 
characteristics of social movements themselves and, to a lesser extent, the political context, affect the 
propensity for movements to experience agenda spillover. 
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As Black Lives Matter (BLM) protests grew larger and diffused across the Summer of 2020 in the U.S. 
(Putnam et al., 2020), the pace and scale of protest shaped the agenda of many other actors. For instance, 
media coverage of BLM increased in 2020 (Mehta, 2020), reflecting a change in the media agenda. Cities 
and counties began reconsidering their police budgets (McEvoy, 2020) and the national American 
political agenda included both systemic racism and criminal justice policy in ways that it had not for 
years, if decades. Even cultural producers grappled with how to reorient their products in light of BLM 
protests (Zeitchik, 2020). This is, of course, not the first time that Black activists have shaped American 
policy and media agendas (Wasow, 2020).  
Indeed, such successes illustrate what social movement scholars have recognized as a key capacity of 
protest: to press items into, and elevate items on, media, policy, and public agendas (Cress and Snow, 
2000, King et al., 2007, McCarthy et al., 1996, McAdam and Su, 2002). Getting onto the media, policy, 
or public agenda is not indicated by a single newspaper article, a one-off mention by an elected official, or 
a single statement of public concern, but instead occurs when an issue has sustained and notable 
prominence on the agenda. Movements have been good at getting onto these agendas. 
Indeed, out of the wide array of potential consequences of social movements (Bosi and Uba, 2009), 
Andrews and Edwards (2004) flag agenda setting as amongst the most important and supported: “Many 
scholars of social movements and public interest groups assume that agenda setting is the arena where 
advocacy organizations will have their greatest influence” (492). However, scholarship on agenda setting 
has never investigated these dynamics within the social movement sector; research asks how social 
movements influence institutional actors agendas but without asking how social movements may 
influence the agendas of other extra-institutional actors, including other social movements. 
In this article, we argue for the importance of this hitherto unacknowledged impact—the ability of 
movements to change each other’s goals/agenda—and situate it within a larger class of social movement 
spillover outcomes (Meyer and Whittier, 1994). Our study of “agenda spillover” argues that serious or 
durable shifts in movement goals and claims represent agenda setting within extra-institutional politics 
and are both likely and important potential impacts of movements. In order to explain this new kind of 
spillover, we synthesize extant research on the multiple ways that movements can influence one another 
and test whether factors that have affected other intra-movement influences also influence agenda 
spillover. We draw on data from the Dynamics of Collective Action (DoCA) dataset and find that 
political context, social movement sector characteristics, and key similarities and differences between 
movements influence agenda spillover. Our introduction of agenda spillover and analysis of its predictors 
represents an important contribution to social movements research on outcomes, which while it has 
advanced significantly over the last two decades (Bosi et al., 2016, Bosi and Uba, 2009), has focused 
more on the political or personal consequences of activism and less on how movements affect one 
another. 
 
2. Agenda Setting in Institutional and Non-Institutional Arenas 
In the social movements outcome literature, agenda setting can involve setting the so-called public 
agenda (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993), as when social movements achieve wider recognition of their 
concerns (Rochon, 1998) or can involve the actual policy agenda, which involves institutional political 
actors raising social movement concerns in hearings, bills, and/or votes as a result of social movement 
influence. Importantly, agenda setting does not require that positive legislative changes eventually result, 
but rather simply that the issues make it onto the institutional political agenda (McAdam and Su, 2002). 
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For instance, Olzak and Soule (2009) find that environmental protest led to more congressional hearings 
on the environment but not to more legislation. Movement mobilization levels are thought to drive this 
increase in legislative attention, including hearings and roll call votes (e.g., McAdam and Su, 2002).  
Agenda setting appears to be an area in which social movements are quite effective, with existing 
scholarship finding substantial support for the agenda-setting effects of social movements (e.g., Cress and 
Snow, 2000, King et al., 2007, see also McCarthy et al., 1996). Positive agenda-setting effects have been 
observed even when movements exert no eventual influence on legislative outcomes (e.g., Johnson, 2008 
on the environmental movement). As noted earlier, Andrews and Edwards (2004) summarize existing 
research by arguing that agenda setting represents the largest impact that many advocacy organizations 
can hope to have. In the next section, we draw on this important body of research but direct our 
investigation towards the agendas of extra-institutional actors, particularly other changemakers. 
 
2.1 Agenda Spillover as a Social Movement Outcome 
   
Scholars have long recognized that social movements can have both external impacts and impacts on 
one another (Staggenborg, 1986). One key intra-movement outcome (Whittier, 2004, Earl, 2000)—social 
movement spillover—captures how social movements directly affect one another. Meyer and Whittier 
(1994) introduced the concept of spillover in their analysis of the effects of the feminist movement on 
peace activism in the U.S. They argued that four kinds of spillover were observable: (1) spillover in 
framing; (2) tactical spillover; (3) leadership spillover through specific personnel; and (4) spillover in 
terms of organizational structures (e.g., feminist collectives).  
Subsequent research has developed each of these lines and also elaborated on some dangers associated 
with spillover (Hadden and Tarrow, 2008). For instance, research has confirmed spillover in framing 
across a range of movements (Meyer and Boutcher, 2007, Boutcher and McCammon, 2019, Barnartt, 
2014). Where tactical spillover is concerned, Olzak and Uhrig (2001) were amongst the first to study this 
empirically, but they have not been the last (Wang and Soule, 2012, Soule et al., 2008), although not all 
of this research has classified itself as spillover research. Terriquez (2015) blends these two forms of 
spillover in her analysis of queer youth in the immigration reform movement, arguing that queer youth’s 
practice of coming out was important to the DREAMers and led to both increased immigration activism 
and the advancement of LGBTQ activism. Isaac and Christiansen (2002) examined organizational 
spillover, arguing that the civil rights movement contributed to the revitalization of labor organizations. 
Researchers such as Minkoff (1997) also added to the range of spillover examined in the literature, 
suggesting that higher mobilization and/or more organizational capacity in affected movements are 
spillover effects. Nonetheless, Whittier’s (2013) review of spillover research asserts: 
 
The types of social movement spillover can be broken down into two broad categories. First, movements 
can lead to new challenges, by changing the overall level of protest or opportunities for protest, sparking 
“spin-off” movements, or provoking countermovements…or enabl[ing] later waves of the same movement. 
Second, social movements can alter the form of other protests. Activists define themselves, frame their 
issues, develop tactics, and establish organizations with reference to what other collective actors have 
done” (np). 
 
Spillover seems to be driven by several key mechanisms, first introduced by Meyer and Whittier 
(1994): (1) connections from coalitions that served as conduits for spillover; (2) shared communities, 
including culture and art, where like-minded views could spread; (3) shared personnel; and (4) effects on 
political opportunities, which shaped the opportunities available to later movements. Subsequent research 
has echoed these claims (Whittier, 2004, Whittier, 2013), for both left-leaning (Wimberley, 2009) and 
right-leaning movements (Deerman, 2017). Subsequent empirical research specified additional 
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mechanisms operating in particular cases (e.g., Isaac and Christiansen, 2002) and/or combined these 
existing mechanisms as part of larger explanations (Hadden, 2014). 
 Given the prominence of agenda-setting effects, it is surprising that spillover research has not 
considered how movements might impact the agendas of other movements.1 Until now, goals have not 
been a focus of spillover research, ignoring the potential of spillover through agenda-setting effects where 
movements come to take on additional issues from other movements. It is unlikely to be the case that 
movement actors only set agendas for public officials. Just as existing spillover research is not interested 
in minor or ephemeral effects on other movements, agenda spillover focuses on more than one-off 
concurrence of otherwise disparate issues at single protest events; agenda spillover is concerned with 
deeper and more noticeable shifts in agendas and/or goals.2  
 We argue that there are several reasons to believe that movements may in fact influence the 
concerns of other movements in these deeper ways. First, just as shared personnel have mattered in other 
forms of spillover, activists moving between movements may bring their concerns into other movements. 
For example, BLM activists may bring concerns about racial justice into other movements in which they 
participate, just as environmentalists may bring sustainability concerns into other movements. When the 
activists serving as couriers for other goals are particularly active or are leaders in SMOs in two or more 
movements, one would suspect that agenda spillover is a real possibility based on existing research on 
leadership overlaps across organizations (Mische, 2008).  
Even without direct ties between movement leaders, it is possible that sustained or large-scale 
mobilization places a movement more in the public eye, on the public agenda, and in the media spotlight. 
All of this should indirectly educate other movements’ leaders about the goals of the mobilizing 
movement. A rise in mobilization or increasing import on the public agenda may also provide incentives 
to other movements’ leaders to try to grab onto the proverbial coattails of a movement that is trending 
positively. It is also likely that the complexity of social issues themselves mean that social movement 
goals impact multiple constituencies and are connected to multiple social movements (Elliott et al., 2021). 
2.2 Overcoming Methodological Limitations 
In our view, methodological limitations are a key reason that research on spillover has been more 
limited, reflecting the substantial methodological obstacles outcomes researchers face (Earl, 2000). In the 
case of spillover, the primary issue is the reliance on a very small number of research methods. For 
example, much of the research on spillover is qualitative, building from case studies (e.g., McKee 
Hurwitz, 2018), which requires having clear expectations about which movements are likely to influence 
one another. Even quantitative work tends to limit research to a handful of movements, as Minkoff (1997) 
does in her examination of whether high protest levels or increasing organizational density in the African 
American civil rights movement led to increases in women’s movement organizing in the U.S. Indeed, a 
substantial amount of spillover research has justifiably examined the impacts that civil rights organizing 




 Work on spillover through framing perhaps comes closest to agenda-setting spillover, but even there the focus is on how 
existing issues can be framed in ever more culturally resonant ways (Meyer and Boutcher, 2007), not on the adoption of 
new issues by other movements. 
2
 As discussed below, issue bricolage is the study of the overlap between two movements at a single protest event and 
does not suggest more serious or durable connection between the movements (Jung et al. 2014). 
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Indeed, virtually all of this work—whether qualitative or quantitative—shares a key characteristic: 
movements that are expected to be at risk of spillover are pre-selected (Isaac and Christiansen, 2002, 
Meyer and Boutcher, 2007). This means that researchers cannot identify unexpected instances of spillover 
across two or more unsuspected movements and scholars risk “selecting on the dependent variable,” since 
often there is already solid empirical reason to believe there is a relationship between movements in many 
of the cases that have been studied. The only exception we can find is Olzak and Uhrig (2001), who 
sought to use quantitative methods to examine tactical spillover but without preselecting movements to 
examine. Their work, however, draws on a very simple understanding of spillover—co-occurrence—
which has clear methodological risks as an operationalization (Elliott et al., 2021). 
Using computational and social network methods, validated by significant pre-study testing (Elliott et 
al., 2021), we are able to methodologically distinguish between ephemeral and even one-off overlaps in 
goals at single protest events—issue bricolage as studied by Jung et al. (2014)—and more durable and 
notable overlaps in goals that indicate the more substantial connection represented by agenda spillover. 
We use these new methods to identify years in which agenda spillover has occurred between two different 
movements. Specifically, our methods, detailed below, allow us to examine all possible pairs of 
movements in a given year and differentiate between pairs of movements that never overlapped with one 
another, movement pairs that experienced fleeting issue bricolage, and movement pairs with substantial 
and/or sustained enough goal overlap to be classified as experiencing agenda spillover. While our 
introduction of agenda spillover and our measurement strategy is novel, we draw on existing research to 
derive expectations about how agenda spillover may operate, as discussed in the next section. 
 
3. Explaining Agenda Spillover by Synthesizing Research on Intra-movement 
Influences 
The literatures on agenda-setting and spillover offer important suggestions about factors that may 
influence agenda spillover. In order to be as comprehensive as possible, though, we also consider factors 
relevant to other kinds of intra-movement influences. For instance, just as spillover researchers have 
examined spillover in framing, particularly thinking about the role of master frames, there is a larger 
literature on master frames that can be considered (Snow and Benford, 1992). Likewise, scholars have 
examined temporary overlaps in protest goals, referred to as “issue bricolage” by Jung et al. (2014), 
which are similar to “event coalitions” (Levi and Murphy, 2006) but do not require organizations to be 
present or collaborating. It may be that some factors that shape temporary overlaps also shape deeper 
overlaps in goals, although we do not expect the processes in their totality to be similar. Likewise, the 
literature on coalitions has examined instrumental and/or deeper substantive ties between otherwise 
distinct movements (Van Dyke and McCammon, 2010), which overlap considerably with predictors of 
other forms of spillover (Meyer and Whittier, 1994). To create the most comprehensive investigation 
based on current research, we bring these literatures together, outlined in Figure 1, to generate seven 
hypotheses. 
As shown on the top of Figure 1, both the spillover literature on framing and the broader literature on 
master frames show that rhetorical relationships between movements are important to consider. Civil 
rights as a master frame is a quintessential example. Master frames in general, and civil rights as a master 
frame in particular, have been heavily featured in research on spillover (Perkins, 2021, Isaac and 
Christiansen, 2002, Minkoff, 1997, Meyer and Boutcher, 2007).  Master frames appear early and become 
modular frames applied to a range of movements within and after that protest cycle (Snow and Benford, 
1992). As Benford and Snow (2000) argue, “[o]nly a handful of collective action frames have been 
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identified as being sufficiently broad in interpretive scope” (619). If agenda spillover operates like frame 
spillover and/or master framing processes more generally, then agenda spillover should occur earlier in 
the protest cycle as initially dominant issues are taken up by later risers; we operationalize this as an 
expectation of a negative linear association between time and agenda spillover (Hypothesis 1). 
 
Jung et al. (2014) note that there may be more than timing at work with the master frame of civil rights. 
They argue that social movement frames that are more modular and popular are more likely to be 
rhetorically connected to other movements, claiming that “many different constituencies can demand 
human rights, education, or civil rights” (204). To try to parse the difference between being an early riser 
and being modular and popular, we test Hypothesis 2 that popular and modular claims will spillover more 
often, net of the timing of their appearance. 
Moving from rhetorical connections that are about how issues are framed to instrumental reasons that 
agenda spillover may occur (see middle band in Figure 1), we suspect that movements may seek to raise 
their status by incorporating concerns from higher status movements (Hypothesis 3). Jung et al. (2014) 
found this to be true in explaining more ephemeral, one-off overlaps that they call issue bricolage (i.e., the 
co-occurrence of claims, issues, or goals at a single protest event).3 They argue that issue bricolage is an 
instrumental enterprise in which lower status movements seek to benefit from the higher status of other 
movements by including some of the higher status movement’s goals into their own protest events. When 




 Much like studies of tactics being used across movements (Olzak and Uhrig, 2001), the idea of issue bricolage is that 
movements from different areas take an issue on for at least a single protest event. If one were to make an analogy to the 
coalitions literature, one could say that where issue bricolage is concerned with ephemeral or event coalitions, our concept 
of agenda spillover is interested in larger and deeper patterns of spillover that look more like enduring coalitions but 
without necessarily happening under the auspices of SMOs through coalitions. 
Figure 1: Potential Explanations of Agenda Spillover 
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However, movements still need to have some commonalities for even instrumental, ephemeral ties to 
develop through shared goals. Research on issue bricolage points to tactical similarities as being that 
important shared tied such that movements that are more tactically similar are expected to have enough in 
common to experience these instrumental overlaps; we expect the same for agenda spillover (Hypothesis 
4).4 This expectation is also supported by work on coalitions,5 whether one considers more ephemeral 
event-specific coalitions (Levi and Murphy, 2006)6 or enduring coalitions that involve collaboration 
across years (McCammon and Moon, 2015).7 
Turning to the bottom portion of Figure 1, the literature on coalitions points to additional factors that 
may impact agenda spillover. McCammon and Moon’s (2015) and Van Dyke and Amos’s (2017) reviews 
of the coalitions literature create strikingly similar portraits of factors that increase the likelihood of 
coalition formation, including: (1) a history of social interaction and ties between participants, leaders, or 
SMOs; (2) SMO characteristics such as being a generalist organization or a more formal SMO; (3) shared 
collective identities and/or communities; (4) significant threats and/or favorable political opportunities; 
and (5) ample and relatively even resources between potential SMO collaborators. While each of these 
factors may be important, there is no singular recipe that drives coalition formation. According to a meta-
analysis of 24 studies on coalitions, there are several different combinations of causal factors that can lead 
to coalition formation (McCammon and Van Dyke, 2010). 
 In thinking about agenda spillover, we argue that just as with coalitions, histories of interaction 
between SMOs are important (Hypothesis 5). This is consistent with research on other forms of spillover, 
which shows shared communities and personnel drive those other forms of spillover (Meyer and Whittier, 
1994), and with research on issue bricolage (Jung et al., 2014).  
Similarly, just as coalitions research suggests that shared ideology, collective identities, or 
communities may aid coalition formation, we suspect they may play a role in agenda spillover. However, 
unlike coalitions between organizations within the same movement—which may be driven by actual 
overlaps in collective identity and social movement communities—we think broader kinds of similarity 
are likely to be impactful for agenda spillover. Echoing claims we made earlier drawing on issue 
bricolage research, we argue that movements with more similar tactical profiles may be more likely to 
experience agenda spillover.  
 
4 Other work examines claim borrowing by SMOs from other movements (Wang et al., 2019), which is like issue 
bricolage but is seen as something SMOs do. But, unlike coalitions, claim borrowing by SMOs doesn’t require a second 
SMO partner. Findings for claim borrowing point to high cohesion and high focus of SMOs as making claim borrowing 
more likely (Wang et al., 2019); however, since this work revolves around organizational identity and processes rather 
than more general social movement agenda setting processes, we focus primarily on the issue bricolage research.  
5
 While we are not focused on social movement organizations (SMOs), or constrained to observing agenda spillover to 
events at which SMOs were present, we think there is much that can be drawn upon from the coalitions literature (Van 
Dyke, 2014, Van Dyke and McCammon, 2010). 
6
 As reflected in Figure 1, some coalitions can be fleeting, which Levi and Murphy (2006) call event coalitions. These 
temporary coalitions occur in relation to specific events. Some may see such ephemeral coalitions as recent 
accomplishments, such as Bennett and Segerberg (2013), who argue that digital and social media makes these temporary 
and ideologically-thin coalitions more possible. Work by Gerhards and Rucht (1992), who studied meso-mobilization, 
suggests that while the frequency of such coalitions may have grown, they are not entirely new phenomena. 
7 Enduring coalitions occur when two or more SMOs collaborate over long periods (McCammon and Moon, 2015). 
Sometimes SMOs can actually join a federation or create a new organization that itself embodies the coalition. Such 
organizations may be seen as similar, in some respects, to Heaney and Rojas’s (2014) hybrid organizations.  
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Several of the literatures we draw on suggest that favorable political opportunities should increase the 
likelihood of agenda spillover, including the coalitions literature (McCammon and Moon, 2015, Van 
Dyke and Amos, 2017). The spillover literature also argues that other forms of spillover are more likely 
when political opportunities are more favorable (Meyer and Whittier, 1994), which is consistent with 
research on a wider range of other social movement outcomes, too (Uba, 2009). Thus, Hypothesis 6 is 
that agenda spillover should be more likely when political opportunities become more favorable.  
It is important to not lose sight of the fact that we are trying to explain a particular form of spillover—
agenda spillover—and thus must also consider factors that have driven agenda setting in the social 
movements outcomes literature. That literature suggests that public policy agendas are driven by 
movement mobilization levels (McAdam and Su, 2002), such that more protest leads to a better chance of 
moving onto the policy, public, and/or media agendas. We think the same will be true as movements 
consider collaborations and overlaps, leading us to suspect that movements with higher overall 
mobilization levels are more likely to influence the agendas of other movements (Hypothesis 7). 
 
4. Data and Methods 
To investigate social movement agenda spillover, we use the Dynamics of Collective Action dataset 
(DoCA), which records information on over 23,000 protest events in the United States as reported by The 
New York Times (NYT) between 1960 and 1995 (McAdam et al., 2009). A team of coders scanned daily 
editions of the NYT to identify collective events articulating a claim, and coded a series of variables about 
the nature of the event and its newspaper coverage. Of particular interest to this project, coders indicated: 
when and where the event took place; up to 4 claims articulated at the event; up to 4 general forms and 4 
specific acts used as tactics at the event; and the paragraph length of the story about the protest event. 
Like other researchers, due to concerns of geographical bias in newspaper data (Earl et al., 2004), we 
limit the dataset to events occurring in New York state (Earl et al., 2003, Soule and King, 2008, Ring-
Ramirez et al., 2014).  
We transform our data from the protest event form of DoCA to an annual time series of movement 
dyads (which are pairs of different movements, discussed below; e.g., civil rights and the peace 
movement form a dyad) based on the original protest data. These data essentially code information about 
protest events associated with each member of the movement dyad and also whether our method, 
discussed more below, identified agenda spillover as occurring between the movements in that dyad in 
that year.  
To produce these movement dyads, we aggregate the claim data so that the claim code represents one 
of 27 broad social movements8 rather than a more specific claim. That is, we group narrow, specific 
claims such as “Anti-Vietnam War,” “Anti-Draft,” “Anti-ROTC, Military/CIA recruitment on campus,” 
and “Anti-Korean War” into an umbrella “Peace Movement.” The primary reason for this aggregation is 
 
8
 The included movements are: anti-nuclear movement; anti-immigrant, anti-foreigner, and anti-asylum movement; small 
or family farms and organic movement; anti-transnational union movement; women’s movement; peace movement; 
international human and civil rights movement; environmental movement; economic issues; poverty and welfare; alcohol 
and drugs; civil liberties; criminal justice; African American civil rights; LGBT civil rights; Native American civil rights; 
Asian American civil rights; Pan-Latino civil rights; non-Mexican Latino civil rights; disabled civil rights; civil rights of 
farm workers and migrants; civil rights for minority groups not elsewhere classified; abortion; anti-ethnic attacks and hate 
or bias crimes; animal rights; and senior citizen civil rights.  
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to set a stricter threshold for what constitutes agenda spillover: it is not simply embracing other 
specialized claims from within a movement; it is combining claims that span broad movements in an 
enduring or substantial way. We also exclude some catch-all claims coded in the original DoCA because 
they are too general to be informative for our purposes.9 To be clear, our data on goals/claims comes from 
the claims made at protest events, not from data on the missions of SMOs that may or may not have been 
present at specific events. We use these data to generate a series of variables that describe the social 
movement sector,10 each movement in a dyad, and the dyad itself. 
4.1 Supplementary Data 
We supplement the DoCA data with data from the official websites of the Senate, House, and White 
House on partisan control of the presidency and Congress, as well as a number of datasets from the Policy 
Agendas Project (PAP), including: Congressional Hearings (The Policy Agendas Project at the University 
of Texas at Austin, 2017a), U.S. Bills (Adler and Wilkerson, 2017), State of the Union Address (SOTU) 
(The Policy Agendas Project at the University of Texas at Austin, 2017c), Executive Orders (The Policy 
Agendas Project at the University of Texas at Austin, 2017b), and TV News Policy Agenda Data 
(Uscinski, 2009). PAP collects and archives public policy data from numerous sources, and assigns each 
observation a policy area code that we map onto our social movements (see Appendix Table A1 for 
details). We use these data to indicate how much attention each movement, or policy issue, received in 
various fora at each point in time. 
The PAP topics and social movements link neatly with one exception: abortion. PAP typically treats 
abortion as part of Civil Rights, Minority Issues, and Civil Liberties, whereas DoCA treats it as a separate 
and unique claim, which we think is also more consistent with how social movements organized around 
abortion during this time period. In order to record counts related to abortion in PAP databases, we did a 
search in text fields and reclassified the PAP code so that it would map onto our abortion classification if 
the field included at least one of the following terms: hyde amend; abortion; pro choice; pro life; pro-
choice; pro-life; embryo; fetus; gestation; reproductive; birth control; contracept; unborn child; protect the 
unborn; protect unborn; trimester; family planning; womb; uterus; ru-486; fetal; partial birth; or partial-
birth.  
4.2 Dependent Variable: Agenda Spillover 
Our purpose is to move towards a better understanding of agenda spillover, and the conditions that 
make it more or less likely. Prior research employed computational and social network methods to 
develop, test, and compare different methodological approaches to identifying agenda spillover with no a 
priori assumptions about which movements may experience agenda spillover and when (Elliott et al., 
 
9
 Excluded claims are: other claims not elsewhere classified; social welfare claims not elsewhere classified, including 
political figures, government policy not elsewhere classified, education, and not in my backyard (NIMBY) claims; 
miscellaneous religious claims; anti-pornography; and miscellaneous social issues.  
10
 We try a specification of models where we keep the claims we excluded (discussed in footnote 9) for calculation of 
social movement sector variables such as status and then drop them, and an alternative specification where we drop these 
claims before computing any measures or models. The effects are robust to both specifications; therefore, we keep the first 
specification that only includes these claims for the purposes of sector calculations because we feel it is more 
representative of each movement’s position in the full social movement sector. 
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2021). That research showed that an ensemble approach using a variety of techniques to analyze DoCA 
protest data could identify agenda spillover with a high degree of accuracy and comprehensiveness.  
Specifically, the ensemble method we use draws on four methods to identify instances of agenda 
spillover such that if any one of the four methods indicates agenda spillover, then the dyad pair is coded 
as experiencing agenda spillover in that year.11 Importantly, all of these techniques were designed to focus 
on statistically noticeable (for computational techniques) or formally identifiable (for social network 
techniques) shifts in overlap that mark the distinction between fleeting or minimal issue bricolage versus 
more palpable agenda spillover. First, the ensemble method looked for statistically significant increases in 
claim co-occurrence from one year to the next, which raises the bar from any co-occurrence (as studied in 
research on issue bricolage) to significant rises in co-occurrence that are not likely attributable to random 
chance or error in the data.12 Second, the ensemble method examined asymmetric co-occurrences by 
evaluating the extent to which two movements frequently protest together but infrequently protest 
separately, referred to formally as the Whitehead method from ecology. Specifically, agenda spillover 
was marked as occurring when association rates between movement dyads were above 90% of other 
association rates using a random graph method. Third, the ensemble method drew on social network 
clique analysis, which examines if three or more claims all have ties to one another through their co-
deployment at protest events. A stable clique had to be identified between the same movements for at 
least two years to indicate agenda spillover. Finally, the ensemble method used correspondence analysis 
to identify movements that related to other movements similarly, as judged by statistically smaller chi-
square distances from other movement dyads. Substantively, this means that claims that became 
increasingly intertwined with one another were identified, again indicating a much deeper connection than 
issue bricolage. 
We use this ensemble method to code the dependent variable in our movement-dyad-year dataset. For 
every year between 1960 and 1995, our dataset contains one row for every possible combination of the 27 
social movements, assuming either or both of the movements in the dyad were coded as participating in at 
least one protest event for that year. Each dyad is assigned a 0 if it did not experience spillover in that 
year, and a 1 if it did experience agenda spillover according to the ensemble method discussed above. 
4.3 Movement and Movement Dyad Independent Variables 
In order to test for effects specific to the individual movements in a dyad, and the movement dyad 
itself, we include the number of events each movement in a dyad participated in during a year as well as a 
squared term for each of these counts as prior research on issue bricolage found nonlinear effects (Jung et 
al., 2014). A dummy variable records whether either movement in a dyad belonged to one of three 
 
11
 Individual methods identified between 30 and 390 instances of spillover in our dataset. When one of the four methods 
in our ensemble method identified a case of spillover, between 37% and roughly 58% of the time at least one of the other 
methods also identified the same case of spillover. This indicates that these methods frequently identify the same cases of 
spillover, but are not redundant. Indeed, the primary motivation for using an ensemble rather than single-method approach 
to identify spillover is that each method on its own has strengths, weaknesses, and unique operationalizations of spillover, 
while the combination is less sensitive to these peculiarities. For more details, see Elliott et al. (2021). 
12
 Here the goal is to understand whether a broad range of factors that have predicted different kinds of connections 
between movements, including issue bricolage, also explain agenda spillover. It is beyond the scope of this paper to 
compare the predictors of differences between bricolage and spillover more narrowly, although future work should 
consider this. 
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especially active and prominent social movements: peace; African American civil rights; or anti-ethnic 
attacks, hate, or bias crimes, also based on prior research on issue bricolage (Jung et al., 2014).  
We measure cultural similarity through similar tactical choices, following Jung et al. (2014), assuming, 
for instance, that two movements that primarily file lawsuits are likely to have more things in common 
than a pair of movements in which one movement organizes boycotts while the other engages in civil 
disobedience. We compute a Jaccard index of similarity to measure how similar each of the two 
movements in a movement dyad are in their tactical selection. The equation for the Jaccard index is: 
 




where 𝐴 represents the set of tactics used by the first movement in a dyad, and 𝐵 represents the set of 
tactics used by the second movement. To calculate this value, we sum the number of different tactics both 
movements used in a given year, and divide it by the number of tactics either movement used that year. 
The computed value ranges between 0 and 1, with a mean of .14. Slightly more than half of dyads share 0 
tactics, suggesting that there is substantial tactical diversity even when some tactics are exceptionally 
popular.13 We also include a squared term for this indicator to test for a nonlinear effect. In classifying 
tactics, we draw on work by Ring-Ramirez et al. (2014) that analyzed the tactical repertoire using these 
same DoCA data.  
To examine status differences, we draw on Jung et al. (2014), who measured status differences through 
differences in Freeman’s (1978) normalized degree centrality. First, we calculated the status of each 
movement separately, according to the following formula:  
 




The status of movement issue 𝑗 at time t is equal to the sum of protest events in which the 𝑗th claim 
was articulated, and which at least one other claim was also articulated, in year 𝑡, divided by the total 
number of active movements in a given year, 𝑁𝑡 − 1, multiplied by the total number of protest events 
where at least 2 claims were articulated in a given year. For instance, in 1968 African American civil 
rights was one of 16 active movements. There were 74 total events where at least two claims were 
articulated that year, including 19 at which African American civil rights was one of the claims. Thus, the 
status calculation for African American civil rights in 1968 is 19/((16-1)(74))=.017. This computed score 
has the potential to range between 0 in 1, but is observed to range between 0 and .04. Once this figure is 
calculated for each movement in a movement dyad, the absolute value of the difference in status is 
calculated for the dyad level. This is lagged by one year, so the effect of status differences on spillover in 
year 𝑡 is predicted by the movement dyad-level status differences in 𝑡 -1. We also include a squared term 
for the status difference to capture a potential curvilinear effect.  
Last, we include two dichotomous variables to indicate whether each movement dyad has a recent 
history of collaboration: one which captures whether the two movements in a dyad had any collaboration 
at a protest event in the previous three years and another which indicates whether the two dyad 
 
13
 Our calculation counts the sharing of a single tactic and doesn’t require that all tactics movements use at protest events 
align. However, the modal number of shared tactics appears low because the dyads include all movement pairs in which at 
least one of the two movements was active, which means that inactive movements can be included in the pair, driving the 
values down. 
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movements were identified as experiencing agenda spillover in the previous three years according to our 
ensemble method.  
4.4 Political Opportunity Variables 
We incorporate a number of indicators to capture the political environment. First, we include a 
dichotomous variable for whether the president of the United States was a Democrat in a given year. 
Second, we include two variables recording the proportion of the Senate and House that were Democrats 
in each session of Congress. These three variables are meant to capture general characteristics of the U.S. 
government that might affect protest and social movement activity.14  
Second, we include a series of variables, specific to each movement or movement dyad, to measure the 
policy attention granted each issue. From PAP data, we obtain a count of the number of times each 
movement was mentioned in a congressional bill or hearing, in a presidential State of the Union address, 
or in an executive order, in the year preceding a potential occurrence of spillover.15 We tested for effects 
both when we summed each of these indicators across both movements in a dyad (results appear in Table 
1), when we included separate indicators for the high and low values for the dyad (results appear in Table 
A2), and when we mix the best fitting measures from these different measures (results appear in Table 2). 
Third, we included an indicator measuring the difference in NYT coverage each movement in a dyad 
received in the preceding year by summing the number of paragraphs written about each movement in a 
given year and then taking the absolute value of the difference in the number of paragraphs written about 
each movement in a dyad. This predictor captures whether it is likely that movement spillover is 
occurring as a result of movements with less media coverage attempting to attract some of the attention of 
highly-covered movements.16  
4.5 Model Specification  
To identify the factors that make agenda spillover across movements more or less likely, we fit a 
discrete-time event history analysis (EHA) for repeated events (i.e., spillover can happen repeatedly 
across time), using the xtlogit command in Stata 14.0, and robust standard errors to account for the fact 
 
14
 In addition, from Jordan and Grossmann (2020) we included the percent of the New York State House and Senate that 
were Democrats in models not presented. This was done to capture the more proximate political atmosphere since we 
limited data to events occurring in New York State, and to address concerns that partisan divides at the national level were 
not clear-cut during our time period and dependent on geographical region. In some models, the coefficient for New York 
State House Democrats was marginally, positively associated with spillover; however, in most models, neither variable 
had any effect on the outcome, and postestimation measures preferred the simpler models that did not include these terms.  
15
 We also weighted each of these variables, as well as the difference in NYT coverage indicator, by the total number of 
potential occurrences. For instance, we divided the number of bills mentioning movement x in year y by the total number 
of all bills in year y. We included this alternative operationalization of variables in some preliminary models and found 
only minor differences in the significance level of some effects, but not in the direction of coefficients or overall narrative.  
16
 We initially included an indicator of the TV coverage granted each movement in a dyad also from the PAP databases. 
This measure proved problematic, however, because there was missing data for all claims prior to 1968 and there was no 
text field that would allow us to code for the abortion claim. Because this variable was non-significant in any model we 
specified, we concluded that TV media coverage did not seem to have a significant impact on agenda spillover and 
dropped this indicator from further consideration and model inclusion. 
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that observations observed at repeated time points are not fully independent. This model predicts the risk 
of dyad j experiencing agenda spillover in time t, based on a linear time indicator17 as well as the time-
varying covariates discussed in the previous section. Each movement dyad remains in the risk set 
throughout the study, for every year in which at least one of the two movements in the dyad is recorded as 
participating in an event, and is marked as experiencing the potentially repeated event of agenda spillover 
in every year in which spillover occurs.  
We ran a model with variables specific to the movements in the dyads, then a model that primarily 
looks at political context variables, and finally a full model that includes both sets of predictors with the 
following equation: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡 ℎ(𝑡𝑖𝑗) = ∝ 𝒕𝑡 +  𝚾𝑡𝜸 + 𝚭𝑡𝜼  
 
where 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡 ℎ(𝑡𝑖𝑗) is an I x 1 (i = 1, …, I where I = the number of movement dyads) vector whose i-
the element is given by the conditional log odds ratio of movement dyad i experiencing agenda spillover 
in year j. The linear term is denoted with 𝒕𝑡, an I x 1 vector of year variables measuring time (t = 1960, 
…, 1995). Coefficient ∝ describes the linear effect of time on the probability that a movement dyad will 
experience agenda spillover. The next term, 𝚾𝑡 is a series of movement dyad variables at time t, and 
coefficients 𝜸 denote the effect of issue and movement-dyad level variables on agenda spillover. Finally, 
𝚭𝑡 is the series of political opportunity variables at time t, and coefficients 𝜼 reflect the impact of policy 
and media attention on the likelihood of agenda spillover.  
Since we test for the effects of political opportunities in two ways—once by summing each relevant 
indicator across both movements in a dyad (see Table 1) and once by using high and low indicators for 
each dyad (see Table A2)—we produce a best fitting model (see Table 2) that includes all political 
opportunity and movement dyad variables that were significant in other models. Indicators that were non-
significant in all three of those models, and for which non-significance is uninformative, are dropped 
from the final model reported in Table 2. 
 
 
5. Findings  
 
We find support for most of our hypotheses, as well as evidence for all three types of effects specified 
in our equation—time, movement and movement dyad covariates, and, to a lesser extent, political 
opportunities—on the probability that a movement dyad will experience agenda spillover. 
5.1 Position in the Protest Cycle through Linear Time 
Hypothesis 1 was that there would be a negative linear effect, with spillover being more probable early 
in a protest cycle, net of shear popularity or modularity of the claim. The best time specification for this 
model was a linear term for time, and we do find that movement dyads are significantly less likely to 
experience agenda spillover in later years compared to earlier years in every specification we used.  
 
17
 For the time specification, we tried three alternative forms: the linear specification for the year; a series of dummy 
variables for each year between 1960 and 1995; and non-linear specifications that included first a squared, and then a 
quadratic term. We settled on the linear specification for several reasons. First, our data includes many time points and a 
fairly rare outcome. Second, postestimation tests such as AIC and BIC preferred the linear model over the more complex 
specifications that included non-linear terms or treated time as a series of dichotomies.  
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AIC 2196.3 2452.7 2207.2 2204.7 
BIC 2290.7 2525.3 2359.7 2328.1 
chi2 1124.7 631.0 1150.3 1143.9 
df_m 12 9 20 16 
Observations 10511 10511 10511 10511 
* All results presented as marginal effects, or changes in probabilities of a movement dyad experiencing spillover. 
**Signs following hypotheses (+/-) indicate hypothesized direction of effect 
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One explanation for this is that spillover is tied to the establishment of master frames. Framing work, 
which includes diagnosing a social problem and of offering solutions, occurs in early phases of 
mobilization (Snow and Benford, 1992). Therefore, spillover may be more likely early in the protest cycle 
as movements seek resonant, inclusive, and energizing messaging, and we find linear evidence congruent 
with this argument.  
It is possible this effect is the result of collinearity with some indicators of political opportunity. 
Although we discuss political context more below, in robustness tests of this time effect, we ran 
alternative logit models that excluded time specification. In those models, having a Democratic president 
in the White House is significantly and positively associated with agenda spillover, whereas having a 
higher percentage of Democrats in the House and Senate are both predictive of lower levels of spillover in 
both reduced and full models. Each of these measures are negatively correlated with time, as all branches 
of the government became, on average, increasingly tied to the Republican Party during the time period 
under investigation. The strongest negative correlation between political opportunity and time was the 
percent of the Senate which was Democratic, at 64%. We suspect, although we cannot be certain, that the 
negative effect of time is also capturing some effects of political climate that changed over the decades 
we study here.  
5.2 Popular Social Movements 
Hypothesis 2 anticipated major social movements would more frequently be involved in spillover. In 
some model specifications, we find a marginally significant positive effect of the prominence of the 
movement on agenda spillover (see Table 1, columns 1, 3, and 4 and Appendix Table A2, column 1), 
although this effect disappears in our final and best-fitting model (see Table 2). This indicates mixed 
support for the possibility that agenda spillover happened more frequently when at least one movement in 
a dyad belonged to the highly prominent African American Civil Rights, peace, or anti-ethnic attacks, 
hate, or bias crimes movements. Future research should consider alternative measures for prominence to 
confirm that being earlier is more relevant than being prominent overall. This suggests that unlike issue 
bricolage, prominence isn’t a clear predictor of agenda spillover. 
5.3 Status Differences 
Hypothesis 3 expected that agenda spillover is more likely among movements with different status. 
There are many reasons social movements may choose to adopt the agenda of another movement with a 
higher or lower status. Higher-status movements may collaborate with lower-status movements to 
reaffirm their grassroots connections, while lower-status movements may seek to collaborate with higher-
status ones to gain experience, network connections, and visibility. Because other researchers find, as 
with tactical overlap, that status differences have a curvilinear effect on issue bricolage (Jung et al., 2014), 
we test both the main effect and a squared term for the difference in status between two movements in a 
movement dyad. Our results show agenda spillover increases as the status difference between two 
movements in a dyad increases, but only to a certain point and this is true across all models, including our 
best fitting model (see Table 2). In other words, agenda spillover is more common among movements that 
are somewhat, but not extremely, different in terms of status as measured by our variation of normalized 
degree centrality.  
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Table 2: Best Fitting EHA Model of Agenda Spillover* 
  Final Model 
Stage in protest cycle (H1: -)** 
      Year 
 -0.00281*** 
(0.000547) 
Popular and modular frames (H2: +) 
     Prominent, either movement 
 0.233 
(0.153) 
Status differences (H3: +)   
     Status difference (t-1)  73.59** 
(23.06) 
     Status difference (t-1, sq)  -2485.9** 
(930.9) 
Tactical similarities (H4: +) 
     Tactical overlap (t-1) 
 1.371*** 
(0.388) 
Histories of interaction (H5: +)   
     History of movement crossover (t-3)  1.077*** 
(0.220) 
     History of movement spillover (t-3)  -0.0282 
(0.219) 
Favorable political opportunity (H6: +)   
     Democratic President  0.0882 
(0.192) 
     Senate Democrats (%)  -0.217 
(1.889) 
     Bills, dyad sum (#, t-1)  0.000132 
(0.000177) 
     Hearings, lower movement (#, t-1)  0.0104** 
(0.00316) 
     Hearings, higher movement (#, t-1)  -0.00766** 
(0.00268) 
     Difference in NYT coverage (#, t-1)  -0.000199 
(0.000280) 
Mobilization level (H7: +)   
     Less active movement count (#)  0.139*** 
(0.0208) 
     More active movement count (#)  0.0235* 
(0.0112) 
     Less active movement count (sq)  -0.00157*** 
(0.000473) 
     More active movement count (sq)  -0.0000569 
(0.0000853) 
lnsig2u Constant  0.112 
(0.281) 
AIC  2196.0 
BIC  2326.7 
chi2  1161.0 
df_m  17 
Observations  10511 
* All results presented as marginal effects, or changes in probabilities of a movement dyad experiencing spillover. 
**Signs following hypotheses (+/-) indicate hypothesized direction of effect 
 
5.4 Tactical Overlap 
Tactical overlap is thought to be an important indicator of cultural similarity between social 
movements. Because of this, as stated in Hypothesis 4, we expected to find that when two movements in a 
movement dyad shared a history of using many of the same tactics, they would be more likely to 
experience agenda spillover as well. We did find evidence for this, with tactical overlap in a previous year 
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being positively and significantly associated with agenda spillover in the subsequent year in all models, 
including our best fitting model. However, we also tested a squared term for tactical overlap based on 
prior research (Jung et al., 2014), but this squared term was non-significant in all model specifications and 
was dropped from our best fitting model (see Table 2). This means that unlike issue bricolage, there are 
no diminishing returns for cultural similarity where agenda spillover is concerned. 
5.5 Histories of Interaction 
As expected in Hypothesis 5, we find that movement dyads with a recent history of interaction are 
more likely to experience agenda spillover compared to movement dyads without that connection. We 
considered two ways of thinking about histories of interaction: a history of collaborating at a protest event 
within the previous three years, regardless of whether our ensemble method identified this interaction as 
an instance of spillover; and a stricter specification that defined a history of interaction as recent agenda 
spillover based on our ensemble method. We find that a history of minimal collaboration (referred to as 
crossover in results tables) is predictive of agenda spillover, but not a specific history of agenda spillover, 
in all models, including our best fitting model (see Table 2).  
5.6 Political Opportunities  
Hypothesis 6 anticipated that agenda spillover should be more likely when political opportunities 
become more favorable. We found some evidence of political opportunity, as well as the media and 
policy attention focused on each movement, affecting the probability of a movement dyad experiencing 
agenda spillover. As discussed previously, part of the reason we did not find strong and consistent effects 
could be because of collinearity between time and the partisan orientation of the United States during this 
time period.  
Importantly, given that there was no clear a priori reason to prefer summing the bills, hearings, and 
State of the Union mentions across the movements in the dyad versus including the counts of the bills, 
hearings, and State of the Union mentions for the higher and the lower of the two movements in the dyad, 
we tested both. Table 1 reports the summed versions and Appendix Table A2 reports the high/low 
specification. When we modeled the effect of congressional bills, we found that the summed version 
performed better than the high/low specification, although it was still not significant in the best fitting 
model (Table 2). For congressional hearings, we found the high/low specification was superior in models; 
these models showed a positive effect on the movement that received less attention, and a negative effect 
on the movement that received more attention. Our best fitting model, shown in Table 2, includes the best 
performing specifications of these variables in a final composite model. Substantively, these models show 
that agenda spillover may be more likely when both movements in a movement dyad receive a moderate 
amount of attention in congressional hearings.  
The effects of other political opportunity variables were less robust. In some model specifications that 
included only a time specification and political opportunity variables, having a Democratic president was 
associated with a lower likelihood of agenda spillover, while having a higher percentage of Democrats in 
the Senate was associated with a higher probability of spillover. In these same models, more attention in 
congressional bills, more references in the State of the Union Address, and a greater difference in 
coverage within the NYT between the two movements in a dyad were positively associated with agenda 
spillover (Table 2 and Appendix Table A2, column 2). In other model specifications, including our final 
and best-fitting model, these variables are all non-significant (Table 2). Together, these findings suggest 
that political opportunities have been more impactful on coalitions than we find them to be on agenda 




5.7 Overall Mobilization Levels  
Last, we examined the overall mobilization level of each movement in a movement dyad, as 
Hypothesis 7 anticipated that higher mobilization levels would correspond to an increased probability of 
spillover. We test for both main and squared effects, for both the more and less active movement in a 
dyad. We find a significant, positive effect of overall activity levels for both the more and less active 
movement in a dyad; however, this effect is nonlinear for the less active movement in a dyad, as the 
squared term for this movement is significantly and negatively associated with agenda spillover. This 
suggests that agenda spillover is most likely to happen when one movement in a movement dyad is very 
active, while the other is moderately active. The high level of activity on the part of at least one of the 
movements is consistent with institutional agenda setting processes.  
 
6. Conclusion 
Prior research has established that social movements are often successful in influencing media, policy, 
and public agendas, but agenda-setting across movements has been seriously understudied. In other 
words, scholars understand how movements influences other institutional actors, but not one another, in 
terms of agenda setting. One probable reason for this is the methodological difficulties in examining 
social movement outcomes, including agenda spillover. We use a methodological innovation introduced 
by Elliott et al. (2021) to identify movements experiencing agenda spillover so that we can model factors 
affecting the probability of agenda spillover. This is an important advance because we use a method that 
goes beyond simple co-occurrence, which is not a meaningful signal of deeper agenda setting. One would 
not consider a single news story or ephemeral and minor attention from a public official to be agenda 
setting. By setting a threshold for inter-movement agenda setting, we are able to focus on more serious 
and durable shifts in agendas.  
Drawing on a wide ranging set of literatures—from agenda setting, spillover, coalitions, and issue 
bricolage research—we tested seven hypotheses and found support for many: agenda spillover is most 
likely early in the protest cycle; agenda spillover happens more often when movements have moderately, 
but not extremely, different levels of status; agenda spillover occurs more frequently among movements 
with overlapping tactical repertoires; agenda spillover is more common among movements that have a 
history of interaction; moderate levels of attention at the congressional level increase the likelihood of 
agenda spillover; and moderate to high levels of movement mobilization increase the probability of 
agenda spillover. But, unlike issue bricolage, agenda spillover was not explained by issue prominence and 
did not experience diminishing returns on cultural similarities (measured through tactical similarity). 
Also, political opportunities appear to play a larger role in coalition formation than we found for agenda 
spillover. 
 This research paves the way for future inquiries into agenda spillover—the factors that predict it, 
and its consequences. We think researchers interested in this topic should prioritize two goals: first, 
researchers should seek to determine whether the patterns we identify generalize to other protest contexts; 
and second, now that a method for identifying spillover at a large scale has been developed, it is possible 
to investigate the consequences of agenda spillover, too. To the first point, we investigate agenda 
spillover in the context of a specific, historical protest cycle and country. Do the factors that predicted 
spillover during, and in the immediate aftermath, of the civil rights protest cycle matter in the same way 
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as social movements increasingly move into digital spaces? Because digital technologies can reduce both 
organizational and personal costs, perhaps contextual factors such as political opportunities and prior 
history of collaboration become less important, while status and cultural similarities continue to impact 
agenda spillover. Does spillover work similarly in other countries and movement cultures? Are there 
other distinctions that are important in other countries, such as checking for the effect of labor as a claim, 
as we do with civil rights in an American context? Regarding the second question: does agenda spillover 
affect other movement outcomes, such as media attention or policy outcomes? If spillover is part of the 
movement-building and framing process, perhaps movements that experience spillover will also reap 
benefits in terms of media or policy attention. These are a few of the many agenda spillover-related 
questions we hope future research will address.  
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Appendix Table A 1: Merging PAP to DoCA 
PAP 
Codes PAP Policy Example (Specific) DoCA Claims DoCA (Broad) Social Movements 
1 Macroeconomics, Taxes, and 
the Economy 
 
Increasing prices, tax increases Economic Issues 
2 Civil Rights, Minority Issues, 
and Civil Liberties 
 
Affirmative action, anti-police brutality, anti-
discrimination, Equal Rights Amendment 
Women’s Movement, Civil Liberties, 
African American Civil Rights, LBGT 
Rights, Native American Civil Rights, 
Mexican American Civil Rights, Asian 
American Civil Rights, Pan Latino Civil 
Rights, Non-Mexican Latino Civil 
Rights, General Civil Rights, Anti-
Ethnic Attacks/Hate or Bias 
 
4 Agriculture Restriction on agricultural imports, anti-
corporate farming 
 
Small or Family Farmers or Organic 
Movement 
5 Labor, Employment, and 
Immigration 
Anti-political asylum, anti-immigration, 
improvement of working conditions 
 
Anti-Immigrant/Anti-Asylum 
Movement, Farm Worker/Migrant 
Civil Rights 
 
7 Environment Rainforest preservation, soil protection, 
anti-fur/leather 
 
Environmental Movement, Animal 
Rights Movement 
8 Energy Anti-nuclear plant construction, anti-nuclear 
plant operating procedures 
 
Anti-Nuclear Movement 
12 Law, Crime, and Family 
Issues 
Drug control, drunk driving prisoners’ rights, 
gun control 
 
Alcohol and Drug Control, Criminal 
Justice 
13 Social Welfare Tenants’ rights, accessibility, media 
portrayals, social security 
 
Poverty/Welfare, Disabled Civil 
Rights, Senior Citizen Civil Rights 




18 Foreign Trade Anti-NAFTA, Anti-UN Anti-Transnational Union Movement 
 
19 International Affairs and 
Foreign Aid 
 
Anti-Apartheid International Human and Civil Rights 
32 Ideological, Social Cause, 
and Political Groups 
Abortion Abortion 
Note: Some PAP policy codes were cross-walked to multiple DoCA social movement codes. The 27 movements we included in 
our analysis correspond to the 27 DoCA social movements in the far right column of this table.  
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Stage in protest cycle (H1: -) 
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AIC 2196.3 2430.9 2206.1 2198.0 
BIC 2290.7 2532.5 2387.6 2335.9 
chi2 1124.7 682.9 1164.2 1160.8 
df_m 12 13 24 18 
Observations 10511 10511 10511 10511 
 
